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and deliberation is too compelling to leave muted. The article concludes with a mooting of the proposal.
I. INTRODUCTION
The three wise monkeys-pictured avoiding evil by covering their eyes, ears, and mouths-show the plasticity of symbols. Once the monkeys might really have symbolized rectitude or probity. (Imperfectly, of course, since they shut out virtue along with evil.) Nowadays, they symbolize foolish obliviousness, like ostriches burying their heads in the sand. 1 Our courts are a little like the three wise monkeys. Courthouse statues are the obvious comparison; perhaps because Lady Justice's self-restraint is more modest-only her eyes are blindfolded, not her mouth or ears-she still connotes impartiality more than its caricature. 2 The comparison gets a bit more pronounced in the Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals. Proceedings begin with a blinkered view of the world, mostly confined to the record below, and conclude with the delphic pronouncement of opinions. Even the hubbub of oral argument-coincidentally presided over by three or more judges-is somewhat misleading. Judges often (but not always) FOLK LITERATURE 157, 173 (1987) (attributing negative spin to later-appearing versions of a Japanese proverb and noting frequent use of the monkeys "in political cartoons to express this notion . . . [of] 'to bury one's head in the sand'"). To be sure, one should also avoid unfairness toward ostriches, who are more responsible than oblivious: They may look as if they are hiding their heads, but they are in fact tending their nests. //www.supremecourt.gov/about/figuresofjustice.pdf (providing close-up photo showing blindfold detail and text, and explaining that blindfold may initially have been incorporated into depictions of justice "to indicate the tolerance of, or ignorance to, abuse of the law by the judicial system," but that it is now "generally accepted as a symbol of impartiality").
interact with counsel, 3 but this is often thought to disguise a conversation among themselves. Some courts even ban cameras because it prevents both counsel and judges from speaking to (and performing for) the public at large. 4 If these norms limit what judges see, hear, and say, it raises the question of whether judges, like the wise monkeys, can appreciate what's being missed.
This article attacks one such norm, that confining oral argument to questions unveiled by the court at argument and addressed impromptu by counsel. 5 That practice makes for better theater, or hazing, but deserves reconsideration. The Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals should speak more often, and could then listen more constructively, by 5. Other aspects of the appellate process may raise related issues of silencing. For example, until relatively recently parties might be prohibited by local rules from citing unpublished opinions, even as these opinions resolved more and more cases. Now parties can cite them, but courts retain discretion as to their release and their effect (and, ultimately, the effect of citing them). See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1. judiciously informing parties in advance about particular issues the court might raise at oral argument.
While this idea is simple, such preliminary questions are quite unusual, particularly in the Supreme Court, and their potential virtues and the appropriate occasions for their use, have not been assessed. The time is ripe. There is a resurgent academic interest in oral argument, along with other aspects of judicial administration, 6 but analysis is often descriptive or veers toward the despairing or utopian-accepting the slow demise of oral argument or yearning for a return to days of yore.
7 Given the potential (but unfulfilled) centrality of oral argument to judicial decisionmaking, more modest, pragmatic, and incremental change deserves consideration.
Part II provides a brief background on the evolution of oral argument. Part III describes the role preliminary questions might serve, including their present use and contemporary examples of when they might have been consequential. Part IV subjects the proposal to its own mooting. Part V concludes. A quick word on scope: The focus is on federal appellate practice, particularly in the Supreme Court, where the problem is clearest and a cure most easily implemented, but similar initiatives in state and other courts-which are already more innovative 8 -would also be welcome.
II. THE EVOLVING NATURE OF ORAL ARGUMENT
Once upon a time, oral argument in the United States was a counsel-driven exercise. Over time, judges seized the reins, and now preside over a bar of extraordinarily talented advocatesincluding via practices that make advocacy more difficult and less useful.
A. The Supreme Court
American courts initially followed England in eschewing written submissions, making oral argument the mainstay of their decisionmaking. 9 In 187, 201 (2005) (suggesting that "judges may also instruct the parties to come prepared to focus on a particularly troublesome part of the appeal or, perhaps, binding legal authority overlooked in their briefs"). Administrative proceedings have occasionally explored similar techniques. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp., Delco Moraine Div. (N. Plant), 1992 WL 373464 at *10 (EPA 1992) (also reported at 4 E.A.D. 334) (noting that parties in a comparable case had been directed to brief certain issues and to "be prepared to discuss [those issues] at oral argument," and directing Delco Moraine parties to brief same issues).
9. See generally ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1990); see also, e.g., id. at 108 (noting that " [i] nitially, the arguments made by counsel to American appellate courts were exclusively oral because of the English heritage of the American legal system and the relative difficulty of having materials printed" but also pointing out that oral argument was eventually limited to "true advocacy" as caseloads increased-which resulted in less time for oral argumentand legal printing became more accessible); R. Kirkland Cozine, The Emergence of Written Appellate Briefs in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 482, 483-84 (1994) (recognizing that "early appellate practice in this country was 'an essentially oral medium,'" and that "[t]he practice of written legal argument . . . is in fact a nineteenth century American innovation in the common law " (citation omitted)). days, 10 but lawyers could also swap in and out like segments of the Pony Express.
11 Such performances were both marvelous and intolerable. As the Court's caseload increased, lengthy arguments prolonged its term, 12 but little could be done about it; arguments were indispensable for a judiciary without staff or library. 13 This also meant that advocates, whether good or bad, had the Court at their mercy, 14 and Justices sat inert during proceedings over which they lacked meaningful control. 15 14. One contemporary reported that "[i]t mattered not by whom the Court was addressed," since any of the age's luminaries "received the same and no greater attention than any second or third rate lawyer arguing his first case." WARREN, supra note 11, at 470-71 (quoting observer).
15. Chief Justice Marshall is supposed to have said that "the acme of judicial distinction" was "the ability to look a lawyer straight in the eye for two hours and not hear a damned word he says," and Justice Story to have found arguments "excessively prolix and tedious." Shapiro, supra note 11, at 25 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 26 (noting one lawyer's estimation that judicial attention to arguments actually declined after the Civil snuck away in shifts to take lunch, but stayed within earshot of counsel, who kept talking, sometimes over the audible clatter of forks and knives from behind the curtain.
16 ) The Court's passivity even gave one Golden Age advocate the perceived license to approach the bench, mid-argument, and take a pinch out of a startled Justice's snuff-box.
17
As the judiciary's stature, and workload, increased, it encouraged briefing and clamped down on the monologues. The Supreme Court, like some state courts, had long required some kind of written submission; changes adopted in the 1830s actually encouraged parties to submit cases on the pleadings, which suggested that oral argument was not sacrosanct. 18 Other reforms followed. During the nineteenth century, the Court adopted rules that limited each side to four hours of argument, and after that two hours; by the early twentieth century this had dropped to an hour, and the Court created a summary docket that capped less challenging cases at thirty minutes per side; since 1970, that has been the default across the board. 19 allotted the easiest cases of a hundred years ago-about the time that it took Daniel Webster to clear his throat.
21
More written submissions, and less air time, naturally affected oral argument's character. Counsel spent less time educating courts on the basics, and a better-prepared bench asked that counsel accommodate questions too. 22 Reports of Justices interrupting argument increased after the Civil War.
23
By the mid-twentieth century, modern argument had more or less arrived, and it was not universally acclaimed. Argument before Chief Justice Hughes (rumored to have cut off one attorney in the middle of "if"), Justice Frankfurter (credited with squeezing ninety-three questions into one case), and their contemporaries was criticized as being closer "to the quiz programs on television than to the magnificent speeches" of yesteryear.
24
This evolution was hardly limited to the Supreme Court, but two of its features deserve special mention. The first is how questions are put to, and by, the Court. As oral argument was cut to one hour per side, the docket shifted to certiorari jurisdiction, giving the Court tremendous discretion as to which cases and issues it entertained. 25 While the certiorari process enhanced the role of the parties in framing the issues for possible review, 26 22. CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 124 (drawing connection between Justices' familiarity with cases through review of briefs and penchant for aggressive questioning).
23. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 26; but see id. (noting that oral argument in Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868), spanned twelve hours over four days, apparently without a peep from the Court). The theatrics and flights of oratory generally continued, however, with the bar being dominated by U.S. Senators-at least one of whom drew praise despite (or perhaps because of) his eloquence when arguing while drunk. CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 121-22. 24. Shapiro, supra note 11, at 27 (quoting an advocate cited in JOHN P. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 102 (1958) 26. See generally R. S. Ct. U.S. 14(1)(a) (directing that questions be expressed "concisely" and "without unnecessary detail" and providing that "[t]he statement of any simultaneously provided peeks into the issues in which the Court was interested: ordinarily, those proposed by a successful petitioner, but sometimes issues that the Court culled from the petition or decided to reframe for itself.
27
A second noteworthy feature of the Supreme Court is, once again, its bar. In the popular account, the Court's early indulgence of oral argument was encouraged by the preternaturally gifted lawyers of the day, 28 though others stress the small size and uneven quality of that era's bar, 29 and complaints about quality did eventually become commonplace. 30 Today, at any rate, elite Supreme Court specialists ensure that many cases are briefed and argued to the highest professional standards. 31 Their proficiency has enabled the Justices to adopt a demanding, even dizzying, style of inquiry that puts non-specialists at a definite disadvantage. 32. Serious inequities between the parties may result. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters, supra note 6, at 1554, 1557 (citing an "advocacy advantage" that goes to clients who can pay for experienced Supreme Court counsel, but concluding that "to some extent, market forces, the significant professional prestige closely associated with Supreme Court advocacy, and Even for regulars, the limits may be glimpsed-counsel can find it difficult to respond to torrential questioning 33 -and Justices, too, have complained about the difficulty in getting questions in edgewise. 34 Justice Thomas, among others, has suggested that advocates are left with ever-dwindling scraps of time in which to present their own arguments;
35 although his long stretches of silence have drawn criticism, 36 they have the virtue of preventing a graver shortage of airtime.
B. The Federal Courts of Appeals
Trends in the federal courts of appeals are similar but more daunting. The length of time allowed counsel at argument now averages fifteen minutes or less. 37 Even that number is largely hypothetical: By 2013, not even twenty percent of the cases resolved on the merits by the federal courts of appeals received the personal commitment of some attorneys to provide able representation to underrepresented interests" may help close the gap). (quoting Justice Alito as stating that "it's extremely difficult to get a question in," and reporting the need to find "a strategic opportunity to get a word in edgewise").
35 any oral argument at all. 38 Unlike in the Supreme Court-which could accommodate longer arguments by hearing (still) fewer cases, or putting additional argument days on its calendar-the federal courts of appeals have capacity constraints that are beyond their control.
39
Other contrasts are worth noting. As with the Supreme Court, appellate litigators-often individuals handling both Supreme Court cases and lower-court matters-are highly experienced and exceptionally talented. Their impact, though, is diluted across higher-volume, geographically diverse circuits; the uncertain availability of oral arguments also puts greater emphasis on briefing. 40 And because the federal courts of appeals exercise appellate, rather than certiorari, jurisdiction, advocates suffer a relative handicap in preparing for argument. Appellants may pursue any properly preserved error, and appellees have latitude in defending the judgment, so many more issues are potentially up for discussion.
Briefing crystallizes the issues on appeal and reduces the potential range of discussion at argument-and, by the same token, some differences between the Supreme Court and lower 38 courts-but the playing field between bench and bar remains far from level. In assessing whether oral argument is unnecessary, an assigned panel has to consider whether the appeal is frivolous, whether the issues have been authoritatively settled or whether the briefs and record are adequate. 41 Initial screenings by staff, evaluating these questions, often identify challenging factual or procedural issues that favor argument, at least in those cases ultimately heard. 42 The result is that the panel convening to hear a case often has-and might relay-a decent understanding of why oral argument is being held, and what has yet to be resolved, but this remains guesswork for the parties.
In sum, the federal courts of appeals hear a smaller proportion of cases, for less time, with greater variation among advocates, and with fewer conspicuous warnings as to what is on the judges' minds; far from reversing course, suggested reforms typically focus on how to conserve further the time for argument. 43 Sometimes the Supreme Court has seemed at risk of following suit. Shortly after her appointment, Justice O'Connor tried to persuade her colleagues that the Supreme Court follow its lower-court brethren in bypassing argument in some cases. 44. CUSHMAN, supra note 10, at 225 (indicating that Justice Powell was wary of the change and that Justice Brennan was strongly opposed).
It seems unlikely that the present Court-with accomplished Supreme Court advocates in its ranks, including Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Ginsburg, and Kagan-would encourage that substantial a retreat, 45 but it raises the question whether there would be any point to resisting.
C. The Value of Oral Argument
The erosion of oral argument may be read as a verdict on its value, so a word on that score is appropriate. 46 At least two views of its potential seem admissible. On a naive view, oral argument allows advocates the chance to persuade judges and address their concerns, and thus betters decisions and opinions. Judges have said that argument sometimes changes how they resolve cases. 47 On a more sophisticated view, argument is 45 . But see FREDERICK, supra note 11, at 2 (cautioning that if "that trend [of reducing the time allotted for oral argument] continues, by later in the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court may eliminate oral argument altogether except in the most important cases, thereby following the trend of courts of appeals that are deciding an ever-larger percentage of cases solely on the basis of written submissions").
46. See generally, e.g., MALPHURS, supra note 6, at 18 (noting widespread scholarly concern about whether oral arguments matter and describing that concern as "the driving question surrounding most academic research on the [Supreme] Court").
47. A number of current Justices have suggested as much. E.g., MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 169-70 (2013) (quoting statements by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy about the importance of oral argument in the decisionmaking process); THEIR OWN WORDS, supra note 34, at 21-22 (quoting Chief Justice Roberts, stating that he changes his mind "[a]ll the time" while listening to argument, and that you "go into argument with not a totally blank slate . . . . but you've got all these questions"); id. at 113 (reporting Justice Breyer's estimate that he changes his mind about which side should prevail after argument in only five to ten percent of cases, but that he "think[s] differently about a case" about one-third of the time); id. at 139-40 (quoting Justice Alito, stating that he "certainly" changes his mind after oral argument, though less frequently about the "bottom line," and that oral argument "tends to crystallize things" for him). Justice Thomas, in contrast, has expressed doubt about the influence of oral argument. See, e.g., THEIR OWN WORDS, supra note 34, at 71, 75; Garner, supra note 35, at 104 (noting Justice Thomas's conviction that the questioning at oral argument is "just too much"). Among former members of the Court, Justice Scalia reported that it is "probably quite rare, although not unheard of, that oral argument will change [his] mind," THEIR OWN WORDS, supra note 34, at 42, and that "very often you come in on the knife's edge, quite undecided," and "oral argument can turn the corner," Antonin Scalia, A Voice for the Write, A.B.A. J., May 2008, at 36, 38. Justices Brennan and White, in contrast, often spoke to the significance of oral argument, as did Chief Justice Rehnquist, see Shapiro, supra note 11, at 29-30 (quoting remarks), the last estimating that it had, in between twenty-five and fifty percent of the cases argued, affected his views somewhat.
predominantly a means for judges to lobby each other, using counsel as though they were ventriloquist dummies. 48 Because argument may be the last (and perhaps the first) real opportunity for judges to interact on a case before voting-Supreme Court Justices typically confer later that same week, 49 and lower court panels may even vote later that same day 50 -it is a critical opportunity to learn what others think and to persuade them. 48. Former Solicitor General Drew Days described occasions on which Justices "are talking to a fellow justice through you," but allowed that there are also "some questions that are real questions" in that "Justices want to know the answer to the question, something that's been Neither view, unfortunately, resolves whether oral argument should be maintained or changed. Either way, argument is consequential, albeit for different reasons, and it undoubtedly matters in subtler ways as well-disciplining written submissions by forcing counsel to anticipate the possibility of being chewed out, promoting judicial engagement, and so forth. Equally important, the payoffs plausibly depend on how courts actually conduct argument, which has changed dramatically over time. Even if one doubts, for example, that arguments today change the outcome of many decisions, that says little definitive about their potential impact. Refining how judges pose questions might improve the payoff on either the naive or sophisticated views. If not, certainly, the entire exercise needs reconsideration.
III. QUESTIONS SELDOM POSED
While modern oral argument often looks like a free-for-all, courts can vary and discipline how they tender questions. The easiest technique-sending counsel questions that might be posed in the actual argument, to facilitate their preparation-is rarely employed, despite the abundance of opportunities.
A. Other Ways to Ask Questions
Although counsel establish, at least initially, the roster of potential questions before the Supreme Court, the Court sometimes shows its hand. When granting certiorari, it sometimes asks the parties to brief and argue an additional question. Such intervention, even if otherwise unwelcome, gives counsel maximum notice, allowing them to adjust both their written and oral presentations. (It also resolves a distinct kind of problem for the Court-anticipating a potential dilemma it might otherwise face between ducking an issue or deciding a question never properly put before it-and remains reserved for important and substantially distinct questions of law. 52 )
thinking," which reflected Justice O'Connor's observation that some Justices use the opportunity to ask questions that will "educate their colleagues" On other, equally rare occasions, the Court, having uncovered an issue not adequately addressed by the principal briefs, has asked that the parties file supplemental briefsusually on threshold jurisdictional questions. 53 If the request comes prior to oral argument, it suggests a possible topic for live discussion, but the primary or even exclusive emphasis is on briefing.
54
Apart from these unusual requests, the Court's practice is to hold fire until oral argument. Once in a while, the Court asks counsel to be prepared to discuss matters not set for (granting certiorari and adding question relating to President's Take Care authority). ( indicating that counsel's substantive opening was "This Court has asked us, of course, to brief and argue an additional issue"), a Justice advised him that he was "perfectly free" to do so, but that it was not required, as "[w]e asked you to brief the additional issue. . . . [w]e didn't ask you to argue it," id. A substantial portion of the Stevens argument was devoted to standing, propelled by questions from the Court, to the point that counsel was eventually advised by a questioner that "you only have half an hour to argue," id. at 15, but ultimately the Court did not resolve the case on that ground. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 787-88 (holding that "a private individual has standing to bring suit in federal court on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act . . . but that the . . . Act does not subject a State (or state agency) to liability in such actions"); but see Docket Entry, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (Feb. 28, 2003) (advising counsel that they "should be prepared to discuss the jurisdiction of this Court and of the Court of Appeals in this case, see Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)," but also advising them to file and serve supplemental briefs on the question).
supplemental briefing. The circumstances tend, unsurprisingly, to the unusual and compelling. For example, in early October 2015, the Court appointed counsel to represent the petitioner in a case to be argued at the beginning of November. A few days before argument, it asked counsel to be prepared to discuss which court a writ of certiorari should be directed toward, and that topic indeed consumed a fair amount of time at the argument. 55 Revealingly, the Court's notice was unusual enough that it attracted media attention. 56 The federal courts of appeals, likewise, have used preliminary questions only sporadically, making the surprise of a pre-argument inquiry rival any averted surprise at oral argument. Jurisdictional issues, or at least a fraction of them, are favorites, 57 but as described more fully below, courts sometimes raise others. 58 Recently, for example, the D.C. Circuit issued a per curiam order "that the Government be prepared to discuss at oral argument whether the evidence on which the Occasionally, the lower courts have attempted to routinize this practice. Panels of the Fifth Circuit used to instruct counsel to be ready to discuss certain topics via a courtly letter explaining that the notice was designed to promote reflection, did not reveal the interest or predisposition of the court as a whole, and was simply part of what the court might wish to discuss with counsel. 60 In 1995, the Third Circuit amended its local rule concerning oral argument to provide that " 60. See BAKER, supra note 40, at 112 n.20 (noting experiments by federal courts of appeals, "most notably the Fifth Circuit," with "the judges on the hearing panel providing counsel with written questions before oral argument"). The late Judge Alvin Rubin of the Fifth Circuit would sometimes draft letters along the following lines, which the clerk's office would then send to counsel on behalf of the court as a whole:
After reviewing the briefs in this matter, the court had a few questions that at least one of the judges who will hear your argument knows in advance he would like to have answered or commented on in oral argument. Knowing that interruption of counsel to put these questions may interfere with counsel's train of thought, and desiring also to give counsel at least some opportunity to reflect on the questions, we are submitting them to you. We suggest that you try to answer them as directly as possible during the course of your argument. Of course, the fact that the court desires to know your answers to these questions must not be taken as an indication of the direction of the court's thoughts or of the issues that the court considers decisive. Instead, they are part of the court's effort to understand the case as completely as possible. You will likely be asked to answer other questions from members of the court as your argument proceeds. These, too, are designed merely to enable the court to understand your position. We hope that you will welcome the opportunity to give us as much information as possible. appeals, the clerk will inform the parties by letter of a particular issue(s) that the panel wishes the parties to address." 61 The rule might have memorialized a practice, rather than changing one, since (by one crude measure) the number of inquiries dropped following adoption. 62 The number of such questions, while fluctuating wildly, has never been substantial, amounting to an average of about six inquiries per year over a twenty-five year period and dropping to less than two per year over the last ten years 63 -this in a court that still resolves well over 200 cases per year after oral argument. 64 The only other court to formalize its practice, the D.C. Circuit, 65 averaged below one inquiry per 62. To get a sense of this volume, I used the Bloomberg electronic database to survey PACER docket information from 1990 to February 2016. The Third Circuit clerk's office does not ordinarily invoke Local Rule 34.1(c) in issuing preliminary questions, but it is possible to search Bloomberg for key phrases (particularly a proximity search for "discuss" and "oral argument") in order to identify potential inquiries of the kind considered here. For sake of potential comparability, the same method was applied to review the other federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court.
The substantial limits of this survey-for purposes of reference, the Docket Survey, on file with author-deserve emphasis. It unavoidably misses some inquiries, due to varying phrasing and deficiencies in the docket entries, while turning up others of a materially different nature, such as denials of dispositive motions (the questions posed by the parties being slated for argument instead) or orders derived from the parties' requests for oral argument. Plainly duplicative inquiries-for example, asking the parties in cases posing similar issues a question concerning the effect of a recent decision-were excluded as necessary to avoid double-counting identical questions to related parties in appeals with different docket numbers. This approach had a disproportionate effect in the D.C. Circuit, which one year posed the same question (concerning the potential impact of pending telecommunications legislation) in seven docketed appeals scheduled for argument in one brief span. Id.
For related reasons, comparisons among the courts are certainly problematic. For example, some courts more readily included the text of actual opinions in the database. In the case of the Ninth and Federal Circuits, the Bloomberg search also produced thousands of false positives due to the framing of attorney-appearance and argument-related orders in those courts; because manual review of the dockets would have been required to eliminate all of these false positives, no conclusions were drawn about either court. Judges with particular predilections for pre-argument questions also appeared to have an outsized influence on their courts' totals (even, potentially, elsewhere, if they sit by designation).
63. Id. year, with three-fifths issued in a mid-1990s burst-about the same overall total as the Sixth Circuit, 66 which had no stated practice at all. In sum, inquiries by ten other circuits combined were but two-thirds of the Third Circuit's total, with many circuits racing the Supreme Court to the bottom.
Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary-
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B. Questions That Deserve Asking
While small as a fraction of arguments, preliminary questioning in the federal courts of appeals to date illustrates when it may be useful. The most obvious subjects of inquiry involve jurisdictional and other threshold issues like standing or mootness.
68 Such questions are especially strong candidates for advance notice, insofar as they are fundamental and nondiscretionary in character; perhaps because they are such an obvious candidate for inquiry, however, advance warning may not be as necessary. 69 In any event, lower courts have also found it fruitful to raise non-threshold legal issues, likely on the supposition that these too may dominate oral argument and deserve the fullest possible preparation. 70 Thus, for example, discussing responsibilities of screening judge and providing that "argument may be limited to certain issues" and that "counsel may be advised that the panel wishes additional questions to be addressed at oral argument" 70. In the Third Circuit, these appeared to outnumber more threshold questions: Less than one-quarter of the legal issues highlighted for counsel concerned what was manifestly a jurisdictional or other threshold question. (That said, the nature of many inquiries was at least somewhat obscure-either because an underlying letter to counsel was only partly summarized, or because the inquiry referred to cases without disclosing the nature of the issue to which the cases referred.) See Docket Survey, supra note 62. Matters were different in the D.C. Circuit, where the overwhelming majority of legal issues posed to parties concerned threshold matters. Id. One might suppose that in any court, when a potential jurisdictional question was spotted, it was much more likely to be posed to counsel before argument; in any case, it is likely that the number of non-threshold questions uncovered by the Docket Survey is just the tip of the iceberg. they have on numerous occasions called on counsel to prepare to discuss particular cases, statutes, or other legal materials not adequately addressed in the briefs, either because they are new or just overlooked.
71
The Supreme Court's practice has been a little different, and in part reflects its different circumstances. The number of potential issues has tapered off by the time a case reaches the Court; given the additional rounds of briefing by that point, the intensity of preparation, and the few decisions in which the Court is actively interested (other than its own), overlooked case law and other legal authority are also less of a concern. These differences, however, are far from categorical. For example, though raising at argument cases not mentioned in the briefs may be entirely within bounds, mentioning them earlier can be mutually beneficial if it is a prelude to further discussion, 72 71. In the Third Circuit, approximately half the inquiries flagged legal authority like cases or statutes, while a slightly smaller number (sixty-five, as opposed to seventy-five) alluded to preparing to discuss legal issues without directly adverting to particular authority. Docket Survey, supra note 62; but see id. (showing that fewer than one-quarter of D.C. Circuit inquiries related to legal authority). Queries as to whether there was any precedent for a particular proposition were uncommon among the posed questions, though those arose often at oral argument; perhaps such questions were hard to frame in advance, or it seemed doubtful that any such precedent could exist, and perhaps the use of that question at oral argument was essentially rhetorical. In another example, then-Solicitor General Kagan was asked about a case that had not been cited in the briefs, and she indicated that she was not familiar with the case, but recovered when its core holding was described. Tr particularly if the case is not widely reported or obviously germane. 73 It takes only a moment's reflection to think of other questions-rarely, if ever, reflected in existing inquiries-for which more than a moment's reflection would be useful; at least some of these conjectures find support by seeing what happened when preliminary questions were not tendered. 74 One broad category involves questions best answered after further research, which can make demands beyond anything answered by assiduous use of Westlaw and Lexis. For example, factual questions may warrant advance inquiry when the record is particularly voluminous, as may be the case following agency rulemaking, or when the court is interested in minutiae. ), "a question from Justice Rehnquist for which I was totally unprepared" concerning the First Amendment rights of corporations, relating to a different but contemporary case, which the Justice proceeded to suggest might be equivalent to those of individuals in press matters).
74. As is evident below, this is easiest to substantiate in the Supreme Court, for which transcripts of oral argument are reliably available; for the federal courts of appeals, some evidence may also be divined from accounts of oral argument in published opinions.
75. In a number of opinions, the federal courts of appeals have complained about the inability of counsel to point to relevant portions of the record, though it is rarely clear whether the record would ever have resolved the questions at hand. See, e.g., United States Sometimes judges ask about obscure or peripheral matters that may not even be part of the formal record, 76 or raise subjects that test the depth of a typical lawyer's (or judge's) expertisev. Parker, 716 F.3d 999, 1012 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that the court "asked government counsel at oral argument to identify the judge's statement that most clearly indicates a finding of willful falsity," but that "[c]ounsel could not point to any such statement"); Everitt v. Pneumo Abex, L.L.C., 411 F. App'x 726, 729-30 (5th Cir. 2011) (pointing out that " [w] hen questioned directly at oral argument, Pneumo's counsel never denied the fact of that cooperation, and was unable to pinpoint any date in this record before the bankruptcy court's January 2006 determination that the parties' cooperative paths diverged"); Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 623 F.3d 945, 966 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting out verbatim an exchange between court and counsel at oral argument, and concluding that the court "simply cannot find anything in the record that suggests that either the parties or the district court appreciate the difference between personal and official capacity § 1983 lawsuits"); United Ins. Co. v. Unisys Corp., 68 F. App'x 269, 270 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that "[a]t oral argument, we pressed counsel for Unisys to show where the protection was acquired, but counsel could not cite any record evidence of such a purchase"); King v. Va. Emp't Comm'n, 33 F.3d 51 (tbl.), 1994 WL 416439, at *6 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[D]espite repeated questions from the bench during oral argument as to where any such evidence might be found in the record, plaintiff's counsel could not locate any, and the court's review of the record discloses none").
By way of contrast, in the Third Circuit, counsel have been constructively asked in advance to address the facts and circumstances relating to a party's prior conviction. 76. In Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, lawyers were vague about when the defendant/counter-claimant first had cause to understand that diversity was incomplete, as well as in regards to case law regarding collateral attacks and the chronology relating to refiling. Tr ( showing question from Justice Stevens soliciting counsel's "view of the strength" of argument in amicus brief by former high-ranking officers and top civilian leaders of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines); BARBARA A. PERRY, THE MICHIGAN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES 114 (2007) (characterizing counsel as being "momentarily thrown," and noting significance of amicus brief's "taking center stage at the Court"); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989) (relying on amicus brief alone in raising the retroactivity of one of petitioner's claims, pointing out that "[t]he question of retroactivity with regard to petitioner's fair cross section claim has been raised only in an amicus brief," but noting that the "question is not foreign to the parties," and characterizing the Court's "sua sponte consideration of retroactivity" as "far from novel" (citations omitted)).
temporarily baffling, 80 they probably reward more careful consideration, at least if they might decide a case or change an opinion.
81 Hypotheticals asked at the beginning of argument (which are less likely to be spontaneous reactions to the proceedings) 82 ( stating, in response to counsel's articulation of proposition that Congress might be able to regulate purely intrastate conduct like marijuana cultivation if it was essential to a "larger regulatory scheme": "You know, he grows heroin, cocaine, tomatoes that are going to have genomes in them that could, at some point, lead to tomato children that will eventually affect Boston"); Tr. of Oral Arg., 82. In one recent case, for example, the first question-from Justice Kagan-was a hypothetical that appeared to confound one of the Court's finest advocates, in part because more central) 83 are particularly appealing candidates for posing preliminarily, but any imagined in advance may be profferedand developing a practice that actually prompts them to be imagined in advance, and worked out in writing, might do wonders to reduce the confusion they can cause. 84. As Justice Breyer once allowed, "this is pretty tough, we try to construct some hypotheticals, and-and the counsel says, oh, I've got this part wrong or that part wrong or the other one, and they may be right. And we can't do this, figuring out all these factual things in an hour, frankly. . . In past arguments, computers were analogized to typewriters, phone books and calculators. Video games were compared to films, comic books and Grimm's fairy tales. Text messages were analogized to letters to the editor. A risk-hedging method was compared to horse-training and the alphabet. EBay was likened to a Ferris wheel, and also to the process of introducing a baker to a grocer. The list goes on.").
85. In a case concerning gay marriage, for example, Justice Sotomayor asked: "Outside of . . . the marriage context, can you think of any other rational basis, reason, for a State using sexual orientation as a factor in denying homosexuals benefits or imposing burdens on them? Is there any other rational decision-making that the Government could make? Denying them a job, not granting them benefits of some sort, any other decision?" Counsel responded, before later recovering somewhat, "Your Honor, I cannot. I do not have anyanything to offer you in that regard. -1491) (showing that counsel answered Justice's query-"one question that's very important for me and you can answer it yes or no"-in the negative, with caveat that "we haven't briefed and studied that").
Not every issue that later appears foundational will have occurred to counsel. For example, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question whether due process permitted the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based solely on acts by an indirect corporate subsidiary on behalf of the defendant. At oral argument, Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan directed discussion away from agency and toward the point that-even if the subsidiary's acts were entirely imputable-there would still not be enough for general jurisdiction over the parent. Transcript] . Later resolving the case on that basis, the Court noted that this was "fairly encompasse[d]" within the question on which certiorari was granted, and that amici had focused on the question. Daimler AG v. Bauman, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.16. Justice Sotomayor, however, observed that the court of appeals had not addressed the question, and that the parties had neither devoted attention to it nor been asked to brief it. Id. at 765-66 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). It might have improved matters to pose the issue before oral argument. See Bauman Transcript, supra this note, at 52 (reporting respondent's counsel stating that "this is an important question that hasn't been briefed in this case, it wasn't preserved below, and I think that you ought to decide the case on the grounds, on the premises on which it has been litigated for eight years," and suggesting that "if you can't do that you ought to dismiss the case as improvidently granted or at least remand the case to allow a full airing of these issues in an appropriate forum").
86. FREDERICK, supra note 11, at 82-83 (quoting argument in Lee v. Weisman, including inability of counsel to answer questions about precise ages, with estimate supplied by Justice Blackmun); id. at 122-24 (noting that in RAV v. St. Paul, counsel for St. Paul could not identify a particular cross-street, apparently near a poorly maintained public park); id. at 124 (noting that though latter exchange "did not contribute to the court's understanding of the issues," counsel had handled it appropriately). Sometimes Justice Blackmun was pursuing a larger point. In a case involving the return of Haitian refugees, the only questions he asked of government counsel were whether she had been to Haiti, and after learning she had not, whether she was familiar with Graham Greene's The Comedians, which she also answered in the negative, prompting him to state simply "I recommend it to you. Rev. 1, 68 (remarks of Maureen Mahoney) (noting that, while one of Mahoney's colleagues had predicted that Justice Blackmun would ask whether she had ever been to Haiti, "the moral of the story . . . is really that if you want to be really prepared for arguments in the Supreme Court, you have got to read a lot of fiction").
at oral argument because they are too complex or distracting, or -if more dramatic solutions, like dismissal or reargument, appear belatedly to the Court to be in the offing-even help enlist counsel in evaluating those options. 87 The primary goal of pre-argument notice, obviously, is to help counsel prepare, particularly for inquiries that are less predictable or more consequential. This is a marginal, but not trivial, objective. Even if the best counsel are fully prepared, or experienced and quick-witted enough, to answer serviceably, not every counsel is among the bar's elite; the best, in any case, are likely to answer a fully anticipated question yet more accurately and persuasively. (That answers could be extracted on the spot is no better defense of present practices than, say, the possibility of writing briefs overnight is a warrant for making that the convention, and while briefing is more important than oral argument, there is no reason to inflate the difference. Supplemental briefing, and not merely a pre-argument question, was probably required. Even so, it was clear at the first argument that several Justices arrived intent on engaging petitioner's counsel (and, to a lesser degree, counsel for the United States as amicus) on extraterritoriality and its compatibility with international law, and advance notice would have generated a sounder preview of the considerations bearing on reargument-including by respondent's counsel. Tr return from giving more time to counsel-assuming that is realistically on the table. Counsel notified of certain issues are likely to be better prepared to deal appropriately with others as well, to the extent they adjust their agenda. Moreover, unlike tweaking time limits, preliminary questions enable consulting others not at the podium. Given a heads-up, clients may provide information or indicate a definitive position, which can be wanting at oral argument. 89 Other lawyers can provide inputjust as with moot courts 90 -and the broader public may even be crowd-sourced; the same counsel would be responsible for answering at oral argument, but without artificial self-reliance.
Ultimately, this serves the judiciary as well. On a naive view of oral argument, capably addressing issues that judges deem relevant improves judicial decisionmaking-and avoids inadvertent error. 91 The same holds even on a more sophisticated view, insofar as better answers to a judge's questions are a more reliable means of persuading other judges. Even if one thinks that answers would largely be unaffected, notice may help courts resolve the weight to place on ensuing exchanges. For example, judges pursue concessions at oral argument, which often prove to be decisive. 92 concerns the legitimacy of depending on "relatively spontaneous"-perhaps browbeaten-"responses of counsel to equally spontaneous questioning from the Court during oral argument."
93 That objection loses force if the question has been previewed. Conversely, if a preliminary question is eschewed, as it may well be, there is still less reason to credit the reply. * * * Because oral argument, at least as it is presently practiced, seems to be of secondary importance in most cases, it is worth recalling that it is one of the few practices-like briefing, or the selection of judges-that potentially affects the gamut of cases, on all legal subjects, heard by appellate courts. This suggests the potential for incremental, subtle payoffs from preliminary questions, but more pointed illustrations may be available. Kennedy had circulated memoranda before argument, with the latter forecasting a decisive shift from jurisdictional arguments emphasized in the briefing to equal protection arguments that had received much less emphasis).
96. There was extensive discussion concerning, for example, an inquiry initiated by Justice Kennedy as to whether the federal question involved was different from that emphasized by counsel for Bush. Bush v. Gore Transcript, supra note 88, at 4-7. Later, Justice Kennedy asked counsel for Gore a hypothetical as to whether the Florida legislature might have, by statute, done what the Florida Supreme Court had attempted, to which counsel replied-"I think that it would be unusual. I haven't really thought about that question. I think they probably could not"-without successfully defusing the issue. actually proceeded by the close of argument. 100 By that point, however, the approach's appeal had been compromised, and it featured prominently only in a dissent for four Justices; 101 prior disclosure might have led to its clarification and a more ringing endorsement-with record citations-by counsel for the EPA, along with any appropriate rejoinders.
Still more recently, Justice Thomas broke his decade-long silence by posing "one question" (which morphed into at least eight more), 102 at the close of respondent's argument, concerning whether there was any other area in which a misdemeanor conviction could support an indefinite suspension of constitutional rights. 103 Counsel was unable to think of examples on the spot, and the question clearly engaged others on the Court, with Justice Breyer expressing the view that it was a "major question." 104 Unfortunately, it was also a question that neither counsel had benefit of beforehand, and oral argument was probably the last opportunity for substantive discussion among the Justices before they gathered to vote. 105 
Citizens United v. FEC
106 may be the litmus test, given breathless accounts that "a single question changed the case, and perhaps American history." 107 The case involved a nonprofit corporation concerned about penalties for making available a film criticizing a presidential candidate. The corporation's objection focused on whether the FEC was applying the federal campaign-finance statute properly, in light of constitutional concerns, 108 but oral argument was more freewheeling. Most notably, the Justices questioned government counsel as to whether Congress could constitutionally prohibit the use of corporate funds to publish books engaged in similar advocacy. The government's position that Congress might be able to do so-perhaps not with respect to media corporations, and perhaps bearing medium-specific considerations in mind, among other things-sounded consistent with the Court's precedent. Justice Alito, however, reacted as though this was "incredible," and others likewise. 109 The Court conducted reargument and held the statute unconstitutional, in part given concerns about the slippery slope toward regulating all forms of political advocacy. 110 It is impossible to show that a preliminary question would have changed the outcome in Citizens United, and there is room for doubt. The basic inquiry was not a bolt from the blue-a facial challenge not being wholly alien to the as-applied issues before the Court 111 -and experienced counsel took it in stride. The Court's order of re-argument on the facial question, moreover, allowed the government to change its answer, which limited any downside.
112 Even so, this was a defective (and avoidable) way of inviting reflective advocacy. Book-related questions were hypothetical in a very strong sense, since before argument they looked to have been excluded from consideration; as Justice Stevens insisted, facial validity was "relinquished below, not included in the questions presented to us by the litigants, and argued"-after the first go-round-"only in response to the Court's invitation." 113 The Justices also formulated their inquiries inexactly, necessitating distracting corrections. 114 Finally, the fact that the government later reversed its position actually suggests that, had the Court posed the question before argument, counsel and its client might have deliberated and settled on a different initial answer, mollifying some of the Justices and changing the case's later direction. Roberts that the FEC could ban certain publications outright, as opposed to restricting the use of corporate treasury funds toward that end); cf. 558 U.S. at 415 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (objecting, after subsequent second argument, to the Court's "ominous image of a 'categorical ba[n]' on corporate speech," which "is highly misleading, and needs to be corrected").
115. For discussion of the Court's dynamics following initial argument, see generally Toobin, supra note 107. The counterfactual is complicated, of course: Justice Kagan, whose first argument as Solicitor General was the re-argument of Citizens United, was confirmed as Solicitor General only five days before the initial argument. Whether she would at that point have anticipated such a question from the Court and mooted an answer, let alone favored a different position without first having seen the Court's reaction to discussion of the issue, is simply guesswork.
116. The Court attributed to the government the position that it was permitted to "ban corporate expenditures for almost all forms of communication stemming from a corporation," and represented that its precedent might permit application of the act to "printing books," but cited without clear effect the government's response that it had not applied and probably could not constitutionally apply the existing statute to a book. and that the Court was somehow obliged to consider facial validity because of "the uncertainty caused by the litigating position of the Government" 117 -were, at least in part, a complaint about the Court's own choice as to how and when to pose its inquiries.
118
Other examples could be cited, but the basic point is the same. If a question deserves a considered answer, as opposed to the best spontaneous answer, it is better tendered beforehand. The commitment to oral argument, even if waning, requires taking seriously the resources it entails. Having established an expert appellate bar, in part through vigorous inquiry, courts should strive to extract better advice from its members-not treat the challenge of argument as an end in itself.
VI. SOME PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS (AND ANSWERS)
Courthouse statues notwithstanding, oral argument has not been cast in stone. The drift of innovation has been toward limiting its availability and duration, but the Supreme Court has shown some flexibility in complex cases, 119 and some Justices
Citizens United at 349. The Court's conclusion-that "[t]his troubling assertion of brooding governmental power cannot be reconciled with the confidence and stability in civic discourse that the First Amendment must secure," id.-is impenetrable. 117. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 333. But see id. at 402 n.7 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Our colleagues have apparently never heard of an alternative argument.").
118. To be sure, this was accentuated by the corporate petitioner, which provoked clarification of its rights by filing the case in advance of any evident interest by the FEC in regulating its conduct.
119. Mainly in terms of adding more time, ranging from the five and a half hours allocated to argument on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act to an additional thirty minutes per side for an important case involving EPA air pollution standards. See have acknowledged the need to manage arguments differentlyif only to avoid a free-for-all. 120 Even so, the idea that preliminary questions could be used more routinely may be viewed skeptically by some judges, so it might be best to preview some of the likely questions, with the hope of provoking satisfactory answers.
COURT: Counsel, we barely had time to get through the briefs. What makes you think we have time to think up questions in advance, let alone agree on which to issue? COUNSEL: Your honor, sometimes preliminary questions will be impracticable. Courts of appeals, though, often cull cases for argument, which might generate possible questions, 121 and so might bench memos prepared by clerks. 122 As to agreeing in advance, individual judges could nominate questions, subject to veto by the other judges hearing an argument, before the clerk's office issues them. The Third Circuit, among other courts of appeals, has made this work, and best practices might be developed. The Supreme Court will do things somewhat differently, of course, but this should be even easier for it to manage. It has a smaller docket and greater capacity. Preparation by the Justices and their clerks before argument-even reaching back to certiorari-may already have generated questions, and could be used to create more. 123 Any Justice could circulate a question directly to the clerk, perhaps for transmission to counsel after approval by at least one other Justice. The Court could even hold pre-argument conferences, but that does not seem essential. Undoubtedly this takes time and effort. But respectfully, if the questions help with issues that are hard to resolve in the short time allotted for argument, investing time up front may save more time in the long run.
COURT: Isn't this just a way of making our jobs harder, and yours easier? It lets you wait to get our questions, rather than preparing on your own.
COUNSEL: It's unlikely that preliminary questions would be so frequent or comprehensive-or timely-as to obviate other preparation. Counsel will know that other questions are likely to develop during argument and will want to develop their own arguments. But if this is a real concern, the clerk could communicate any preliminary questions only shortly before argument. Any advance notice, however short, would reduce surprise, permit some contemplation and consultation, and make for better answers.
COURT: Won't questions just excite the media? We have issues with the media.
COUNSEL: It's true that, no matter how many caveats you give, questions may be pored over to see if they reveal the court's disposition. Interest may wane if such questions become routine. Naturally, if a particular question has the potential to cause dramatic effect, like a huge swing in the stock market, it could be held back until oral argument or never posed at all. Preliminary questions will probably attract the same kind of attention as questions posed at argument, and to that extent, may moderate reaction to the argument itself. There's one SCRIBES J. LEG. WRITING 5, 7 (2010) (discussing need for Justices to prepare for oral argument by contemplating questions and the rationale behind each, while allowing for spur-of-the-moment questions as well).
potential difference, however. While preliminary questions can be issued for the court as a whole, via the clerk 124 -and then raised at argument by counsel, the presiding judge, or any judge at all-questioning now is unavoidably associated with a particular judge, personalizing the inquiry and fueling speculation about that judge's vote. 125 The relative anonymity of preliminary questions might reduce media sensationalism and even coax reluctant questioners off the back bench.
COURT: Some of you-some of us, even-think we ask too many questions as it is, to the point where counsel can't answer them all. Wouldn't this just make things worse? COUNSEL: Just as you say, your honor, self-restraint may be necessary. It's not clear, though, that preliminary questions would hurt. Circulating good questions might cause other judges to belay their own. And preliminary questions need not be discussed if other questions are more pressing-counsel will have to react to the questions actually posed during the allotted time, just as before. Naturally, if this results in a surplus of quality questions, the court can always allow additional time to answer them.
COURT: Well that's the key right there. Extra time makes preliminary questions unnecessary. Or we can order supplemental briefs or post-argument submissions, 126 or even order re-argument. 127 No need to mess around with how we question. No one option does everything, so it's better to add to the judicial toolkit. Additional argument time may not improve the quality of an impromptu answer; it doesn't allow for research or reflection, let alone enable counsel to confer with colleagues or clients not sitting at counsel table (and courts of appeals, at least, do not have lots of extra time lying around). Supplemental briefing requires time and resources, and may be unworkable if questions surface only shortly before argument; post-argument submissions are certainly a great option, and should be encouraged, but they may also be too little too late. 128 Re-argument is the most substantial undertaking, usually saved for the most significant type of reorientation, and ordering it can be divisive. 129 It seems better to try hard to get argument right the first time.
COURT: Supposing this helps counsel advocate more effectively, so what? If you haven't noticed, we're really arguing among ourselves.
COUNSEL: Duly noted. Some judges have suggested that courts should focus on enhancing advocacy instead, since you can lobby each other off the clock. 130 But-and this is to answer you more directly, your honor, even if the real argument is being conducted among the judges, preliminary questions can help. A judge interested in jump-starting consideration by her colleagues might propose a preliminary question, before views become too fixed. (She could also hold back a hostile question, the better to surprise counsel, but then any judge more friendly to counsel's position could offer it instead.) Basically, preliminary questions offer new options without killing off any old ones.
COURT: We already do this when we want to, which is almost never. Deciding what to ask at oral argument is so much easier. I can withhold questions if things are going fine, or throw a monkey-wrench at counsel if they are making their positions sound better than they are. If I lob a question that isn't great, at least it looks ad-libbed; if it is brilliant, I get all the credit. COUNSEL: Naturally, your honor, most questions will still await oral argument. But there's value in rethinking this practice. Judges may not have internalized all the potential virtues or opportunities, or how things are done in other courts; most judges have likely never even tried to issue preliminary questions to see whether it works for them. Courts could also initiate broader experiments in their use, such as through their local rules and practices, and clerks of court could routinely ask judges their own preliminary question as to whether there are any preliminary questions for counsel. If I may, your honor, this is not just about choosing when to pose preliminary questions yourself, but also about how judges might react when they are not posed. Judges, perhaps, can be faulted when they fail to give adequate opportunity to answer. If you ask an unexpected and important question at argument, your colleagues might legitimately discount the answer. They might even say that you could have spent the time to hone the question and provide it in advance, if it seemed important to you at argument but a bit convoluted or confusing.
COURT: [Unintelligible]
COUNSEL: All I really mean, your honor, is that judges who try this more often may become convinced of its value, as they get better answers that produce better decisions.
COURT: Suppose you're right, counsel. If this makes so much sense, how is it possible that courts don't do it already?
COUNSEL: I see that I am out of time.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nothing can supplant counsel's obligation to anticipate the countless directions the argument might take, and to distinguish themselves by preparing accordingly. 131 Nor will anythingeven collegiality-prevent a judge from asking whatever comes to mind. Discussion at oral argument will inevitably, and appropriately, remain unscripted and unpredictable. Referring to his time as Solicitor General, Justice Jackson used to say that he always made three arguments in every case:
First came the one that I planned-as I thought, logical, coherent, complete. Second was the one actually presentedinterrupted, incoherent, disjointed, disappointing. The third was the utterly devastating argument that I thought of after going to bed that night. 132 persist. Counsel and courts benefit, though, if these gaps narrow. Counsel can plan a superior argument, and one better aligned with the perfect argument imagined afterward, if they anticipate a key question that might be raised during the actual presentation. Admittedly, what Jackson regarded as "utterly devastating arguments" will remain a rare commodity, even with the greatest notice. But isn't it wiser to ask first?
